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Thurgood Marshall has taught us two lessons. The first demands that
equality always be taken seriously and the second demonstrates how the law
might be used to meet that demand. The revolution in the law that he so
inspired began with race, but in time reached other disadvantaged groups,
including women. Building on Marshall's achievements and the other hard
fought victories of the civil rights movement, feminists have been demanding
a true and substantive equality for women and using the law to achieve their
purposes.
Sometimes, as with abortion or birth control, law has been used to combat
law: the federal constitution has been used to annul state statutes that
criminalize abortion or impede information about, and proper access to,
birth control. Law has appeared, so to speak, on both sides of the issue,
though the higher law has been identified with the cause of liberation, thanks
to decisions like Griswold v. ConnecticutI and Roe v. Wade. 2 In other in-
stances, however, especially when the law has been used not to invalidate
legal enactments, but to eradicate deeply entrenched social practices, the role
of the higher law has not been so glorious: the federal constitution has been
used as an instrument of resistance.
This odd reversal of the role of the Constitution in the struggle for equality
has a faint counterpart in the civil rights area. Some resisted Brown v. Board
of Education 3 in the name of federalism and freedom of association, and
sought to buttress their arguments by invoking the federal constitution. But
this strategy of resistance was largely unsuccessful. In the feminist context,
however, the situation is different. Statutes prohibiting sexual discrimination
in the workplace and those requiring maternity leave have withstood consti-
tutional challenge, in no small measure thanks to Marshall, 4 but measures to
combat pornography have been constitutionally crippled. A case in point is
the antipornography ordinance of Indianapolis, Indiana, enacted in 1984 and
struck down in its entirety the very next year by a federal appeals court.
5
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. Law Clerk to Thurgood Marshall, 1964-65, when
the Justice served as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Jennifer K. Brown and Daniel Hildebrand in the
preparation of this article.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (Marshall, J.).
5. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
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Campaigns to curb pornography have been commonplace in American
history, and the reasons underlying them manifold. What is distinctive
about the feminist campaign is that it is predicated upon the egalitarianism
that inspires the entire feminist movement. Certainly not all feminists sup-
port the campaign against pornography, 6 but many of those who do justify
their action in terms of equality. Their concern is not with the offensiveness
of sexually explicit images, but with the use of those images to eroticize the
subordination of women. The Indianapolis measure was an attempt to curb
an industry whose product arguably creates and perpetuates inequalities be-
tween the sexes, not just in the bedroom, but also in the workplace and the
university, and for that matter throughout society. As Andrea Dworkin and
Catharine MacKinnon, leading figures in the antipornography campaign,
have insisted on numerous occasions, the Indianapolis ordinance should be
seen as a civil rights law. 7
In striking down the measure, Judge Frank Easterbrook, author of the
appeals court opinion, relied on the First Amendment provision protecting
freedom of speech: however noble its purpose, the ordinance abridges the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Some have responded to
Easterbrook by pointing to the harm caused by pornography and insisting
that state policy permitting the perpetuation of this harm is at odds with the
Fourteenth Amendment and its promise of equality. This response does not,
however, appear wholly satisfactory. Even granting that this harm exists,8
such a response leaves us confronting the familiar conflict between liberty
and equality, not knowing exactly which one should be given priority.
Thurgood Marshall and others who look to him for guidance have insisted
6. See, e.g., Alice Echols, The Taming ofthe Id: Feminist Sexual Politics, 1968-83, in PLEASURE
AND DANGER 50 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984) (Pleasure and Danger is a collection of papers
presented at the 1982 conference "Towards a Politics of Sexuality" held at Barnard College in New
York City); Ellen Willis, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE
POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 460 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983). See also Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A.
Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce et al., in American Booksellers As-
sociation v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1987).
7. See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY & CIVIL RIGHTS:
A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 15-16, 24-30 (1988); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis
Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 163, 172 (1987).
But see Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and
Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1609-12 (1988) (characterizing MacKinnon's campaign as essentially
moralistic). For the history surrounding the passage of a similar ordinance in Minneapolis, Minne-
sota, see Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV.
607 (1987).
8. For a discussion of whether pornography in fact causes harm to women, and an assessment of
some constitutional issues raised by antipornography legislation, see Frederick Schauer, Causation
Theory and The Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 737; Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589; Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Consti-
tutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 18-29 (1992).
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upon the centrality of equality to the constitutional order, but never to the
point of excluding liberty or making freedom of speech a secondary value.
Indeed, some of Marshall's most memorable decisions, including one on ob-
scenity, celebrate freedom of speech.9 Like most liberals, Thurgood Marshall
wants both liberty and equality, and recognizes that these values feed. on one
another. What is therefore needed at this point is not simply the assertion of
equality as a countervalue, but a second look at liberty: is the Indianapolis
ordinance in fact a violation of the freedom of speech?
In addressing this issue it is important to avoid the approach of Judge
Easterbrook which treats the ordinance as a single unified whole. The ordi-
nance carefully distinguishes among four offenses, and the differences among
these should be respected. One provision prohibits coercing people to per-
form in the production of pornography; a second prohibits forcing people to
view pornography; a third addresses physical assaults inflicted by someone
moved or provoked by a pornographic work; and a fourth prohibits traffick-
ing in pornography.10 All four offenses share a common enforcement struc-
ture-no criminal sanctions, but cease-and-desist orders and damages, issued
by an administrative agency and subject to full judicial review. The ordi-
9. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 774 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that denial of temporary visa to Marxist scholar violates First Amendment); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (invalidating law prohibiting possession of obscene material); Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (upholding right to picket
in shopping center parking lot). See also his decision as circuit judge, Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 345 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1965) (loyalty oath required of state university faculty presented a
substantial federal constitutional issue), aff'd, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and his extraordinary action as
Solicitor General confessing error in an obscenity prosecution, Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S.
264 (1966) (urging Court to dismiss conviction of obscenity charges because prosecution violated
Justice Department policy).
10. Section 16-15 makes unlawful those discriminatory practices listed in § 16-3 (g), including
these pornography-related offenses:
(4) Trafficking in pornography: The production, sale, exhibition, or distribution of
pornography....
(5) Coercion into a pornographic performance: Coercing, intimidating or fraudulently
inducing any person, including a man [or] transsexual, into performing for pornography,
which injury may date from any appearance or sale of any product(s) of such
performance. ...
(6) Forcing pornography on a person: The forcing of pornography on any woman, man,
child, or transsexual in any place of employment, in education, in a home, or in any public
place.
(7) Assault or physical attack due to pornography: The assault, physical attack, or injury
of any woman, man, child, or transsexual in a way that is directly caused by specific
pornography.
Indianapolis and Marion County, Ind., City-County General Ordinance No. 35 § 1, § 16-3 (June 4,
1984) [hereinafter Indianapolis Ordinance]. Section 16-26(d) allows the equal opportunity advisory
board to issue cease-and-desist orders against anyone found to be engaging in an unlawful discrimi-
natory practice and to award damages to victims of discriminatory practices that violate the Code.
The full text of the ordinance can be found in DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 106.
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nance contains a strong severability provision' I and thus recognizes that dif-
ferent offenses present different First Amendment issues, some more difficult
than others.
The least problematic provisions of the ordinance are those that protect
against coerced performance in the production of pornography and the
forced viewing of pornography. They are predicated on the claim that many
persons are forced to participate in the production of pornography,' 2 and
that people are sometimes forced to view pornography in situations ranging
from the workplace to the intimacy of the home.
In judging these provisions, I begin with the view that the First Amend-
ment is an instrument of democratic self-governance. 13 It calls for wide and
stringent protection for those who speak, or write, or otherwise communicate
to the public-protection not just for the words they choose, but also for the
means of producing and distributing their speech. State regulation of the
means of producing and distributing speech are commonplace, but the First
Amendment requires that those regulations not impoverish public debate.
Imagine, for example, a statute strictly rationing the use of paper to produce
political tracts' 4 or one aimed at preventing litter which banned all handbil-
ling on public streets.15 Such measures would be unconstitutional.
There is, however, no comparable danger with the provisions of the Indi-
anapolis ordinance respecting "coerced performance" or "forced viewing."
Like the examples just mentioned, they do in fact regulate the means of pro-
ducing and distributing speech, and as such inevitably would have some ef-
fect upon public discourse, but the exercise of state power in both instances is
strictly limited by the notion of "coercion" or "force." These provisions re-
quire that pornography be produced without forced labor and distributed to
willing recipients. Through operation of cease-and-desist orders, and as a
result of the deterrent effect of liability rules, speech that violates these re-
strictions would be withdrawn from the public domain. But that is not a loss
to be regretted, any more than we regret the loss of speech attributable to
rules against plagiarism or copyright infringement. The "forced viewing"
11. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 10, § 8.
12. Central to this provision is the life story of Linda Marchiano, who under the stage name
Linda Lovelace starred in the famous pornographic movie Deep Throat. LINDA LOVELACE &
MICHAEL MCGRADY, ORDEAL (1980). See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and
Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 127, 127-33 (1987).
13. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 785 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986).
14. Cf Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
15. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (holding that municipal ordinance prohibit-
ing distribution of printed matter in order to keep streets clean violates the First Amendment). For
more recent developments, see Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, in COMPELLING Gov-
ERNMENT INTERESTS: THE MYSTERY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed.,
forthcoming 1993).
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and "coerced performance" provisions seek to protect the freedom of per-
formers and the freedom of the audience, and thus tend more to promote
than to destroy First Amendment values.
Of course, "coercion" and "force" are terms capable of great expansion
and manipulation. But they appear throughout the law, both in common law
rules and in statutes, and there is no reason to believe that they are especially
lacking integrity when used in this context. As is always the case, they need
further limitation and specification, 16 but Judge Easterbrook never gave the
courts the opportunity to develop the necessary limiting rules. He declared
the ordinance invalid on its face. He did not base this preemptory ruling on
the expansiveness of the notion of "coercion" or "force," but apparently ob-
jected to the partiality of the regulation: pornography may not be the only
form of literature or art where there is "coerced performance" or "forced
viewing," yet the legislature only focused on it.17
Admittedly, the legislature could have proscribed "coerced performances"
in the production of all sexually explicit material, or for that matter, all
forms of art or literature, or could have prohibited the "forced viewing" of
16. The ordinance made a gesture in this direction by providing that, in the context of "coerced
performances":
(A) Proof of the following facts or conditions shall not constitute a defense:
I. That the person is a woman; or
II. That the person is or has been a prostitute; or
III. That the person has attained the age of majority; or
IV. That the person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone involved in or
related to the making of the pornography; or
V. That the person has previously had, or been thought to have had, sexual rela-
tions with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making of the pornogra-
phy; or
VI. That the person has previously posed for sexually explicit pictures for or with
anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making of the pornography at
issue; or
VII. That anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has given permission on
the person's behalf; or
VIII. That the person actually consented to a use of the performance that is changed
into pornography; or
IX. That the person knew that the purpose of the acts or events in question was to
make pornography; or
X. That the person demonstrated no resistance or appeared to cooperate actively
in the photographic sessions or in the sexual events that produced the pornography; or
XI. That the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a willingness
to cooperate in the production of pornography; or
XII. That no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the making of the
pornography; or
XIII. That the person was paid or otherwise compensated.
Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 10, § 1, § 16-3(g)(5).
17. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per
curiam, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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any film or art. Yet there was ample basis for it to believe that these evils are
sufficiently prevalent in the production and distribution of pornography of
the type proscribed, as to warrant separate and immediate treatment. There
is nothing arbitrary about the partiality and it works to the advantage of the
First Amendment. The legislature need not burden all speech to address the
harms produced by certain types of speech. Of course, as a consequence of
the legislative selectivity, films with sexual explicitness would be saddled
with rules that are not encountered by other types of films that arguably
involve "coerced performance," for example, those films involving torture or
violence in a nonsexual setting. But this type of differentiation cannot be
compared to the state disadvantaging one political candidate or position over
another, which is a form of partiality that is unfair and an improper interfer-
ence with popular sovereignty. In the electoral setting, the assumption is
that the state can claim no justification for the partiality of its regulation
other than the desire to favor one candidate. In the case of the Indianapolis
ordinance, the state is trying to protect against coercion in the least intrusive
way possible.
Similar considerations apply, though perhaps with less force, to the provi-
sion of the ordinance regarding pornography that causes assaults or physical
attacks. This aspect of the ordinance is a response to situations in which a
bizarre sexual crime, for example, a gang rape on a pool table in a barroom,
closely tracks an act described and eroticized by a particular work of pornog-
raphy. Like all the other offenses specified in the ordinance, this one is
framed as a prohibition that is enforceable by both cease-and-desist orders
and damage awards. But because it is conditioned upon a showing that there
was in fact an assault, which was directly caused by a pornographic work,
this provision should be understood as establishing a system of accountabil-
ity, as creating liability for producers and distributors of pornography for
physical attacks that might be triggered by one of their works. After liability
is established, a cease-and-desist order might be issued, but the damage
award and the prospect of other claims would discourage any further circula-
tion and make the cease-and-desist order unnecessary or of only marginal
importance.
At first glance, it would seem that this provision of the ordinance could be
squared with the First Amendment on the theory that it treats works that
cause sexual assaults as though they are incitements or solicitations to vio-
lence. The First Amendment does not bar the state from punishing both the
rioter and the person who incited the riot. A problem arises, however, be-
cause we can never be certain as to which utterances might constitute an
incitement. We fear that by imposing liability upon someone for speech that
is shown to be an incitement, we might discourage speech that does not con-
stitute an incitement and that should not be discouraged. The danger of this
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chilling effect-deterring what should not be deterred-is manifest when
criminal sanctions are threatened, but it is also present when there is a risk
that damages will be awarded. Indeed, in the libel area we recognize that
allowing a person to recover damages for an injury to reputation from false
statements might chill or discourage the press from quite proper and impor-
tant reportage or comment.' 8 Similarly, there is reason to fear that allowing
a victim of a rape or physical assault to recover damages from the publisher
of a magazine or producer of a film that led to a sexual attack might danger-
ously chill or discourage all kinds of publications or films, many of which are
essential for free and open debate on issues of public importance.
The risk of this chill cannot be denied. Yet we learned to cope with it in
other branches of the law, including libel, recognizing that it is a price that
must be paid in order to accommodate conflicting values. A similar attitude
seems appropriate here. The Court's response to the possible chill of libel
laws was not to transform the First Amendment into a blanket prohibition of
such laws; rather the Court acted more circumspectly. It barred criminal
laws against libel of public officials' 9 and created specific limitations to the
cause of action for damages, for example, by requiring proof that a speaker
knew or had reason to know what was said was false.20 In a similar spirit,
the system of accountability established by the Indianapolis ordinance seeks
to minimize the risk of a chilling effect. There is no criminal liability, only a
right to sue for damages, and the person seeking to recover damages is re-
quired to show that: (1) there was a "direct" causal relation between the
assault and the pornography; (2) the assault was tied to some "specific" por-
nographic work; and (3) the defendant knew or had reason to know that the
work met the statutory definition of pornography.
2'
Clearly, the Indianapolis City Council might have done more to minimize
the chilling effect. For example, the ordinary standard of proof in civil cases
might be increased to require a clear and convincing demonstration of the
direct causal link between the assault and the pornography. Or proof might
be required that the defendant intended or wanted such an attack to occur,
or was recklessly indifferent to whether it might occur. As enacted, the ordi-
nance requires the defendant in a damage action to have known that the
work met the statutory definition of pornography, but it does not require a
linkage between the intention or desires of the defendant and the sexual as-
sault. The solicitation or incitement analogy would seem to suggest such a
18. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (critics of government would be
deterred by a rule allowing libel judgments for any false statement).
19. Id. at 273.
20. Id. at 279-80.
21. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 10, § 1, § 16-3(g)(7), (8).
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linkage, but that may reflect principles governing the criminal law rather
than the requirements of the First Amendment.
The judgment of whether these additional safeguards are needed depends
on a nuanced assessment of the risk of a chilling effect juxtaposed against the
need to prevent sexual assault. As with the limiting rules surrounding the
use of terms like "coercion" and "force," some of these safeguards might
have been developed on a case-by-case basis as the ordinance was applied
over time. But, once again, Easterbrook was too impatient for that: striking
down the ordinance before it was ever applied, he denied the courts the op-
portunity so effectively used in the libel context to seek an accommodation of
conflicting values by crafting additional safeguards. He objected to the sys-
tem of accountability within the ordinance itself, complaining that the defini-
tion of pornography upon which it rested made actionable only those works
that advanced a certain viewpoint regarding women, specifically, the view
that women are sexual objects to be used by men. 22 Pornography was de-
fined in the ordinance as the "sexually explicit subordination of women,"' 23
and the system of accountability was thus limited to that which embodied or
advanced such a view of women. Easterbrook saw this as a forbidden in-
stance of viewpoint discrimination. 24
Like every law, the Indianapolis ordinance embodies a viewpoint. It pro-
motes the view that women should not be subordinated and should not be
subject to physical violence. It also exposes films and productions which
embody or express a contrary view to a system of accountability for sexual
assaults that might result from the expression of that viewpoint. As with the
"coerced performance" or "forced viewing" provisions, a certain genre of
literature or art-that which is sexually explicit and subordinates women-is
subjected to risks that others are not. For example, there is no system of
accountability for works that cause physical harm to, or otherwise promote
the subordination of, other groups (e.g., blacks or Jews), regardless of
whether these works are sexually explicit. Nor is there a system of accounta-
bility for sexual assaults on women that might somehow be triggered by sex-
ually explicit works that celebrate the power of women or that view women
on equal terms.
However, these limits on the system of accountability do not strike me as
fatal. The legislators may well have decided that the likelihood of physical
assault triggered by films or magazines is far greater for women than other
disadvantaged groups. Other groups may be subjected to what is euphemisti-
cally called "hate speech" today, but they do not confront the level of expo-
22. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
23. See infra note 28 (statutory definition of pornography).
24. American Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
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sure presented by the pornography industry. 25 Moreover, as to sexually
explicit works that present women on equal terms, the legislature was surely
entitled to take the position that the risk of physical violence triggered by
such works is so negligible or trivial that it does not justify regulation.
These are the kind of judgments that legislators make all the time, and it is
hard to see why the First Amendment denies them the opportunity to do so
here. The Indianapolis City Council could have created a system of account-
ability for all physical assaults directly caused by a film or magazine; in that
instance, the analogy to the law imposing liability for libel or incitement to
violence would be stronger. But the First Amendment would not be served
by requiring a system of such total regulation, for the risk of a chilling effect
would be considerably broadened. In that sense, the partiality of the regula-
tion serves First Amendment values rather than interferes with them. The
partiality of the regulation may skew public debate by heightening the risks
associated with the production of one art form. But disadvantaging one,
though only one, form of art that leads to violent victimization imposes little
distortion on the democratic process and at the same time is narrowly tai-
lored to protect women from severe injuries.
In another branch of First Amendment law, one concerning the regulation
of public fora, the Supreme Court has developed a body of decisions that
condemns viewpoint discrimination and that might be thought to lend sup-
port to Easterbrook's position.26 The imagined situation is a street corner
with two speakers holding forth-one in favor of the war, one opposing it-
and the decisions in question deny the state the power to discriminate or
choose between these speakers-to arrest one speaker, but not the other.
One can well understand the power of the principle against viewpoint dis-
crimination in the imagined context, but in truth that principle has only lim-
ited applicability to the system of accountability enacted by the Indianapolis
City Council.
To begin with, one should note that the norm against viewpoint discrimi-
nation, like any antidiscrimination rule, does not forbid all distinctions but
only unjustified ones. The state cannot choose between two speakers on the
street corner on the ground that it would like to hear one viewpoint discussed
rather than the other. That would be an impermissible distortion of public
debate. It can, however, arrest one of the speakers on the ground that he or
she is inciting a riot. Similarly, while the system of accountability established
25. See, e.g., DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 15-16, 24-30 (sexism is more pervasive
than other forms of discrimination because pornography has, throughout history, consistently de-
fined women in unequal roles); MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 163-97 (same); PORNOGRAPHY: RE-
SEARCH ADVANCES & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS (Dolf Zillman & Jennings Bryant eds., 1989).
26. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (invalidating Chicago
ordinance that barred all pickets near schools except those by organized labor, on the ground that
the city had no compelling interest in favoring labor pickets).
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by the Indianapolis ordinance distinguishes between two viewpoints that may
be furthered by sexually explicit work-women as equal versus women as
subordinate-that difference of treatment can be justified on the ground that
one type of work is more likely than the other to provoke physical assaults.
There is ample evidence indicating that this was the reasoning that led the
members of the City Council to limit the system of accountability as they
did,27 but their intent is not controlling. In judging the action of the police
officer who arrests the speaker, what is crucial is not the actual motivation
for choosing between speakers, but whether an independent objective basis
exists for that choice. In this case, the proper inquiry is whether there is a
basis for distinguishing between these speakers because one, but not the
other, is likely to lead to sexual violence, a harm the state may validly seek to
prevent.
Public forum cases not only permit the state to choose among speakers,
provided the distinction is not based on a judgment about the merits of the
idea being expressed, but they also bear witness to a general First Amend-
ment rule that allows state regulations that have the effect of stopping or
discouraging speech. As these cases indicate, the First Amendment does not
act as an impenetrable shield around a speaker, even one holding forth in a
public forum, but rather forces the state to bear the burden of giving an
especially urgent or weighty justification-a compelling one-for any regula-
tion that has a silencing effect. Annoying pedestrians is not enough of a
justification, but preventing a riot is. The Indianapolis system of account-
ability will have a silencing effect, but surely Indianapolis has a compelling
interest in deterring sexual attacks and compensating victims. Indianapolis
might have been content to hold responsible only those individuals who en-
gaged in the physical attack, but there are considerable advantages-argu-
ably compelling ones-for going further back in the causal sequence. Most
important, doing so makes it less likely that the attack will ever occur; it
operates as a double check and makes the prospect of a damage recovery
more realistic.
27. The Indianapolis City Council found that:
Pornography is a discriminatory practice based on sex which denies women equal oppor-
tunities in society. Pornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for
discrimination. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subordination
based on sex which differentially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it promotes,
with the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for equality of rights in
employment, education, access to and use of public accommodations, and acquisition of
real property; promote rape, battery, child abuse, kidnapping and prostitution and inhibit
just enforcement of laws against such acts; and contribute significantly to restricting wo-
men in particular from full exercise of citizenship and participation in public life, includ-
ing in neighborhoods.
Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 10, § 1, § 16-1 (a)(2).
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This leaves for consideration the trafficking provision of the Indianapolis
ordinance, which I have saved for last because it presents the greatest chal-
lenge to freedom of speech. Unlike the "physical assault" provision, it is not
aimed at the consequences of the published material, and unlike the "coerced
performance" and "forced viewing" provisions, it is not limited to means of
production or distribution that are coercive, but rather it seeks to stop all
production and distribution of such material. In that sense, the offense con-
sists of the production and distribution of the material itself, not the conse-
quences it might produce, nor the coercion used in its production or
distribution; for that reason, the tension with the First Amendment is most
acute.
This tension is acknowledged in the ordinance itself. The ordinance de-
fines pornography in general terms as "the graphic sexually explicit subordi-
nation of women," and then identifies six different categories of material.
28
The offenses of "physical assault, .... coerced performance," or "forced view-
ing" could involve material from any of the six categories, including the last,
which seems aimed at so-called soft-core pornography: "Women are
presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation,
possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission
or display."' 29 This last category of publication appears broad enough to in-
clude the familiar Playboy or Penthouse but is beyond the reach of the traf-
ficking offense. That provision applies only to the most violent and brutal
forms of pornography, which are described by the other five categories. Cat-
egory (2), for instance, consists of material that presents women "as sexual
objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped."
°30 Category (3) con-
sists of material that presents women "as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
28. The full definition reads:
Pornography shall mean the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in
pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being
raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or
physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts;
or
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abusement, torture, shown
as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions
sexual; and
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploita-
tion, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or
display.
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mutilated. ' '3'
This limitation on the trafficking offense-removing soft-core pornography
from its reach-decreases its likely efficacy. Feminists do not attack pornog-
raphy because it is shocking or indecent, but rather because it works to per-
petuate the subordination of women. The underlying premise of such
regulation is that pornography leads men to form a powerful association be-
tween sexual arousal and female subordination, and thus creates and sustains
barriers to women's equality that are rooted in male sexual identity.32 There
is a question, at least in my mind, as to whether the feminist campaign
against pornography is premised on an over-valuation of the role of artistic
or literary material as a key determinant in the socialization process of men
and the formation of their sexual identity, and those doubts grow in so far as
the attack becomes confined to the more extreme categories of pornography.
My hunch is that brutal magazines or films of the type covered by the traf-
ficking offense play a negligible role in our culture, and in the socialization of
most men or in the formation of their personalities. 33 This does not mean
that the ban on trafficking is unjustified, but only that the justification is
more attenuated than might first appear and is often buttressed by conceiving
of it as the first step in a long evolutionary process (start with the worst and
the lesser will fall).
While narrowing the focus of the trafficking offense lessens its likely con-
tribution to the achievement of equality, it also lessens the force of the First
Amendment objection. Seen in its proper form, the question posed is
whether the First Amendment protects the production and distribution of
sexually explicit material that presents women as sexual objects who, for ex-
ample, enjoy sexual pleasure when being raped. This kind of material hardly
seems central to democratic debate and in fact seems included within that
larger category of material-"obscenity"-that the Supreme Court has rou-
tinely allowed to be curtailed, even by threat of criminal prosecution.
Judge Easterbrook notes that the definition of pornography in the ordi-
nance does not meet the criteria that the Supreme Court laid down in Miller
v. California34 to mark the outer bounds of obscenity censorship. According
to that case, the material must (1) appeal to a prurient interest in sex, (2)
portray sexual activity in a patently offensive way, and (3) lack serious social,
aesthetic, or political value.35 Judge Easterbrook is entirely correct in noting
31. Id.
32. See MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 172 ("What pornography does goes beyond its content: it
eroticizes hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality.... It institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy
.... "); see also ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 241 (1981) (por-
nography's main theme is male power over women).
33. See generally Gey, supra note 7, at 1606-07.
34. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
35. Id. at 24.
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that the Indianapolis ordinance does not use the Miller formula to define the
proscribed material. But, unlike Easterbrook, I do not believe this omission
justifies invalidating the trafficking provision in the preemptory way that he
did.
First of all, the Miller constitutional definition of obscenity has been used
by the Supreme Court on a case-by-case basis to determine whether some
particular criminal prosecution or civil interdiction could stand. There is no
requirement that the state statute or local ordinance itself incorporate, in so
many words, the Miller definition. In fact, most of the state and municipal
obscenity statutes that have come before the Court have had no definitions of
obscenity whatsoever, and the Court did not respond to this omission by
invalidating those laws. Even when it ruled in favor of speech, it protected
the material and left the statute standing. For example, the Supreme Court
set aside Massachusetts's attempt to censor the book Fanny Hill on the
ground that the material lacked one of the requisite elements of the constitu-
tional definition of obscenity, but the Court did not invalidate the state stat-
ute. 36 A similar method could have been applied to the Indianapolis
ordinance: the court could have waited to see whether the banned material
actually met the constitutional definition of obscenity. It would be hard to
imagine material falling within the trafficking offense that is not patently of-
fensive or does not appeal to a prurient interest in sex. Even though the
ordinance was not self-limiting, a judge could have waited, as the Court did
with Fanny Hill, to see whether the particular work in question had serious
political or aesthetic value.
There was, moreover, no need to assume that the Supreme Court's current
definition of obscenity-the so-called Miller test-is the only possible test for
identifying sexually explicit material that is censorable. At the moment there
is a settled quality to the Miller test, but in truth it is a relatively recent
creation. The Court's definition of obscenity was first suggested in a 1957
decision, 37 it evolved during the 1960s, 38 and then received yet another refor-
mulation in Miller in 1973. 39 The Miller definition is but a gloss upon the
First Amendment, trying to accommodate three different considerations: (1)
an appreciation of the dangers to social norms and even to physical well-
36. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966).
37. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-89 (1957).
38. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 383 U.S. at
413 (holding that sale of book with some social value is not constitutionally protected where the
seller's emphasis is solely on the book's sexual content); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966)
(holding that prurient-appeal requirement of the prevailing obscenity test should be assessed with
regard to the interests of the intended audience).
39. On the history of this branch of American law, see HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRA-
DITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 33-53 (1988) (reviewing evolution of obscenity
jurisprudence).
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being arguably presented by obscenity; (2) respect for the original intent of
the First Amendment, on the theory that the framers did not think that by
protecting "the freedom of speech" they were protecting free circulation of
obscene publications; and (3) a commitment to broaden the gambit of public
discourse as a way of furthering democratic values. The Miller definition
might be taken to represent a sensible accommodation of these conflicting
concerns, yet there is no reason to believe that it is the only possible accom-
modation, or that it should preclude other efforts. In fact, the Supreme
Court has itself reformulated the constitutional bounds of state power to in-
terfere with speech when it has dealt with sexually explicit material depicting
or aimed at children,4° or material that is carried over the public airways.4'
The Indianapolis ordinance invited another reformulation, for another and
perhaps more worthy cause: sexual equality.
In objecting to the trafficking provisions of the Indianapolis ordinance,
Judge Easterbrook again complained not only of the fact that the definition
of pornography in the ordinance is not coextensive with the Miller test, but
also that it is viewpoint specific:42 pornography is defined not simply in
terms of sexual explicitness, but also requires the subordination of women,
for example, the depiction of women as sexual objects who experience sexual
pleasure in being raped, cut up or mutilated. A work that is sexually explicit,
but expresses a revulsion toward such horrors would not be covered. In that
sense, the trafficking provision of the Indianapolis ordinance is indeed view-
point specific, but that should not prevent it from constitutionally being ap-
plied to a work that otherwise met the Miller test.
All obscenity ordinances seek to further some particular viewpoint-for
example, about the proper attitude toward sexual behavior or what kind of
sexual activity should be publicly displayed-and are allowed to stand,
notwithstanding the ban against viewpoint discrimination, because they are
based, not on disagreement over the idea expressed, but on the harm to social
norms or values that would be occasioned by the distribution of the material.
Most traditional obscenity statutes are not viewpoint specific, but imagine an
obscenity ordinance specifically aimed at sexually explicit films that eroticize
sodomy and present it as a highly pleasurable form of sexual activity. Pre-
sumably, its viewpoint specificity would not prevent that ordinance from be-
40. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-38 (1968) (holding that the judgment of
whether material directed to minors is pornography is based on its appeal to the prurient interests of
juveniles, not adults); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (holding the Miller test need
not be satisfied for sexual materials depicting children).
41. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (noting
that broadcasting receives "the most limited First Amendment protection because of its pervasive-
ness and accessibility to children").
42. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd per curiam,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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ing constitutionally applied to a film that otherwise met the Miller criteria.
The film could be banned if it appeals to a prurient interest in sex, is patently
offensive, and is without serious aesthetic or political value. Similarly, the
fact that the Indianapolis ordinance defines the limits of the offense in terms
of a specific viewpoint-that it is wrong to present women as sexual objects
who enjoy rape-would not put it outside the bounds the Supreme Court has
established for obscenity regulation.
43
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a stern warning against the state using
the broad power it has over a so-called unprotected category of speech to
favor one side in a political debate.44 The case in question involved "fighting
words," not obscenity, but Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, repeatedly
used an example from the obscenity field to argue his position. He thought
there was no difference between using a partial or selective ban on "fighting
words" to advance the cause of tolerance and manipulating the "obscenity"
exception to stifle criticism of government. He took as his starting point the
proposition that it would be unconstitutional to "enact an ordinance prohib-
iting only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city
government or, indeed, that do not include endorsement of the city
government.
'45
It may seem that the Indianapolis trafficking provision runs afoul of
Scalia's stricture since that provision is linked to the cause of equality: only
those images or words that subordinate women or somehow promote their
subordination, as opposed to their elevation or equal treatment, are pro-
scribed. But Justice Scalia made clear that he is not proscribing all
selective regulations, nor even those that embody a content discrimination,
but only those in which, as in the obscenity-city government example he
used, the content discrimination is unrelated to the "distinctively proscrib-
able content" of the speech. 46 He is complaining of extraneous content
discrimination.
Justice Scalia's hostility toward content discrimination is based on the fear
that it tends to "drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace,
47
but he does not see such a danger when the content discrimination that de-
fines the selective regulation is related to the reasons why the state is allowed
to regulate the category of speech in the first place.48 Accordingly, he ac-
43. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 768.
44. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
45. Id. at 2543.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2545 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991)).
48. "When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination
exists." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
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knowledged that the federal government could choose to criminalize only
those threats of violence that are directed against the President, since, as he
wrote, "[T]he reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amend-
ment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President. ' '49
Similarly, while the trafficking ban does indeed single out certain sexually
explicit images or material, specifically those that subordinate women, the
reason for that selection is closely related to one of the reasons why obscenity
is proscribable in the first place: to protect women from violence and sexual
abuse.
50
Thus far I have suggested, contrary to Easterbrook's opinion, that the traf-
ficking provision of the Indianapolis ordinance is consistent with the
Supreme Court's stance on obscenity. At the most, one can say that some
applications of the Indianapolis ordinance might be prohibited, depending
upon, first, the specific nature of the material, and second, the specific limits
placed on the state under the Miller test or some variant of it. If the Supreme
Court's position is still good law, then the trafficking provision of the Indian-
apolis ordinance should have been allowed to stand, though with limits ap-
plied to it on a case-by-case basis. A deeper objection to the trafficking
provision comes from those who have serious misgivings about obscenity reg-
ulations in general, a group that includes a good portion of the liberal com-
munity, including many who strongly support the feminist movement. They
doubt the validity of the trafficking provision of the Indianapolis ordinance
not because it conflicts with what the Supreme Court has said is permissible
in regulating sexually explicit material, but rather because they believe that
the Court's willingness to tolerate obscenity regulation is a serious compro-
mise of the commitment to protect the freedom of speech.
One branch of this critique of obscenity regulation strikes me as unpersua-
sive. It is libertarian in nature, and decries the Indianapolis trafficking provi-
sion, as well as any obscenity statute, because such statutes interfere with the
freedom of artists, writers, and publishers to convey their views and ideas to
the public. These critics view the First Amendment as a protection of indi-
49. Id.
50. The coerced performance, forced viewing, and physical assault provisions are selective regu-
lations that involve content discrimination, but the content discrimination is not extraneous. In any
event these provisions clearly fall within a number of the exceptions Scalia created to his rule. One
exception allows the state to accord differential treatment to a content-defined subcategory of pros-
cribable speech if the subcategory is associated with the so-called "secondary effects" of speech; as
he indicated, "A State could, for example, permit all obscene live performances except those involv-
ing minors." Id. at 2546. A second exception, crafted with an eye toward Title VII sexual harass-
ment claims, allows the state to make content-based distinctions in cases where the law is "directed
not against speech but against conduct" and the speech is "swept up incidentally" as part of the
regulatory scheme. Id.
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vidual autonomy: a freedom to speak, to say whatever one wishes. To me,
however, such an interpretation of the First Amendment is unappealing
either as a rule of law or as a philosophic principle, for no reason is given to
prefer the autonomy of the speaker as opposed to the autonomy of those who
might be harmed or offended by the speech.51 Filmmakers treasure the free-
dom to make the kinds of films they wish, and writers and publishers are
equally insistent on their freedom. But it is not clear why their freedom
should be given a priority over the freedom that other people have to control
the kinds of works they are exposed to or the kind of environment in which
they live.
A second critique of the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrine-one associ-
ated with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn,52 and more persuasive to me-
sees the First Amendment more as an instrument of collective self-govern-
ance than of individual autonomy. It casts the underlying theory of the First
Amendment in democratic terms, as a way of ensuring the essential precon-
dition for popular deliberation and choice-robust public debate. Obviously,
speech that specifically addresses some question of government policy has an
immediate and direct claim to protection under this theory of free speech.
But art and literature, even that which makes no mention of politics and
government affairs, is also protected. As Meiklejohn insisted, "I believe, as a
teacher, that the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems
'because they will be called upon to vote.' -53 Art, all art, even the sexually
explicit, can be politically valuable and as such is most assuredly part of what
I have referred to as public debate-that sphere of human activity that the
First Amendment seeks to protect and enlarge.
5 4
Traditional obscenity regulation threatens to curtail and diminish the ro-
bustness of public debate without offering a countervalue comparable to that
underlying laws prohibiting incitements to violence or making libel actiona-
ble, and thus should be viewed with great suspicion. The same danger to free
speech is presented by the trafficking provision of the Indianapolis ordinance,
even though it has a narrower compass than the typical obscenity regulation.
The ordinance seeks among other things to interdict sexually explicit works
of art or literature that portray women as experiencing sexual pleasure dur-
ing rape. Although rape or mutilation is horrible and is to be condemned in
51. See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 13, at 785.
52. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 27 (1948) (First Amendment protects discussion of different views as a principle of
self-government); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245, 255 (First Amendment protects thoughts and actions necessary for governance).
53. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, supra note 52, at 263 (quoting Harry
Kalven, Jr., Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 16).
54. This point is addressed at greater length in Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censor-
ship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2091-92, 2103-04 (1991).
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the most emphatic way, this law regulating the expression of views about, or
depiction of, rape should be no more acceptable than a law that banned traf-
ficking in works of art or literature that extolled the pleasures or desirability
of adultery or sadomasochism.
Some may see a difference between rape, on the one hand, and adultery or
sadomasochism, on the other, inasmuch as the raped woman is an involun-
tary victim of a criminal attack, while participation in adultery or sadomas-
ochism is presumably both consensual and generally legal. It is also true that
rape and the fear of rape, unlike adultery and perhaps also sadomasochism,
perpetuate the subordination of a disadvantaged group and thus offend the
egalitarian aspirations of the Constitution understood in the most general
terms. All this might be acknowledged, yet it does not require a different
result under the First Amendment. Democracy requires that all laws, in-
cluding the constitutional guarantee of equality, always be open to reconsid-
eration, revision and repeal. I emphatically reject the notion-made famous
in our time by Robert Bork 55-that the First Amendment leaves unprotected
advocacy of unlawful or even unconstitutional conduct. To borrow a formu-
lation from the Supreme Court, under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea.56
This view of the First Amendment does not leave the state powerless. The
state is of course free to outlaw the undesirable conduct advocated, and all
incitements to unlawful action. For example, while the state may not pro-
hibit the general advocacy of the violent overthrow of government, it is cer-
tainly free to make it a crime to violently overthrow the government, or,
more significantly, to incite others to engage in that conduct. 57 Incitement
occurs when individuals are being urged to engage in the proscribed conduct
and the matter has passed beyond the deliberative sphere. There is no more
room for speech.
Indianapolis may have been exercising this well-recognized state preroga-
tive when it provided for damages for someone assaulted as the direct result
of a specific pornographic work. Conceivably, the trafficking provision might
also be understood as a means to curb incitements to violence. In so far as it
is backed by a damage remedy, it may discourage speech that incites vio-
lence. It may, however, be extremely difficult to measure damages, since the
violence has not yet occurred, and as a result the trafficking offense is likely
to be enforced only through cease-and-desist orders. Even then, the incite-
55. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 29-
31 (1971).
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
57. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (proscriptions against advocating
force only unconstitutional when advocacy has become an incitement to imminent lawless action);
see also KALVEN, supra note 39, at 119-236 (outlining development of First Amendment exception
for incitement).
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ment theory would require, on a case-by-case basis, a showing that the
speech passed beyond the general advocacy of an idea to an actual incitement
of imminent illegal conduct. In the case of printed material, this is a difficult
standard to meet, though perhaps less so with films.
The state might also have the right to stop the general advocacy of an idea
when that advocacy has the effect of interfering with the speech rights of
others. In that instance, the state ban on speech does not restrict or impover-
ish public debate, but paradoxically enough, broadens it, for it allows all
voices to be heard. 58 The state acts not as a censor, but rather as a parlia-
mentarian, requiring some to shut up so others can speak. Arguably, the
trafficking provision of the Indianapolis ordinance could be justified on the
ground that pornography silences women.59 But once again, to avoid un-
leashing a general censorial power, one must be careful to delineate two dif-
ferent kinds of silencing dynamics.
One is ideational. It is derived solely from the content of the message.
Pornography, especially of the type that is the subject of the trafficking provi-
sion, may be understood as a demand or plea that women be silent, or some-
how be silenced through violence. It is as though the pornographer said
"women should not speak" or "women should not be taken seriously." A
question can be raised as to whether pornography, even of the brutal kind
covered by the trafficking provision, can be reduced to, or can be said to
promote, this idea. But even if pornography can be understood in this way, I
am wary of using the idea alone as a predicate for state regulation. My reluc-
tance stems in part from doubt that the plea or demand for women's silence
is, in itself, effective. Saying something does not make it so. I also fear that
the recognition of such a silencing dynamic would remove from public dis-
course a whole category of ideas, namely, those that demand that various
people be silenced or kept in silence ("Kill the Jews," "Reinstate Slavery,"
"Establish a Dictatorship of the Proletariat"). Life on this planet would be
significantly better without these ideas in circulation, but allowing the state
to ban them would give it the power to determine which ideas should enter
or become part of public debate, a power that is inconsistent with the value
entrusted to the First Amendment-popular sovereignty.
58. See Fiss, supra note 54, at 2100-01 (state should ensure that all views are heard).
59. See MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 193 (pornography silences all women by destroying credi-
bility and devalidating); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, The Sexual Politics of the First Amendment,
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 206, 208-09 (1987) (First Amendment absolutism protects pornogra-
phy, "the speech of men that silences the speech of women"). This essay is Professor MacKinnon's
response to Judge Easterbrook's opinion. For further elaboration of the silencing theory, see Frank
I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Por-
nography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989). For a brief response, see Ronald Dworkin,
Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN: A CELEBRATION 100, 107-09 (Edna & Avishai Mar-
galit eds., 1991).
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The second silencing dynamic is sociological. It complains not just of the
idea ("women should be silenced"), but of the conditions and circumstances
under which the idea is circulated and distributed. It complains not of de
Sade, or of the writing of a book, or the making of a film that eroticizes rape,
but of the industrial dimensions of pornography: the constant bombardment
in our culture of books, magazines, and films that propound this idea. It is
not any particular work of art or literature that is the source of concern, but
rather the fact that women know that in any place-Indianapolis, New York
or Rome-there is a flood of books, magazines, films, or video cassettes that
present them as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped,
cut up, or mutilated. It is this social practice, rather than any particular
book, magazine or film itself, that induces fear in women and inculcates in
them the habit of silence, or that leads men not to listen to what women say
or not to take them seriously, at least about the terms of their social exist-
ence; it is this social practice that impoverishes public debate and gives sub-
stance to Catharine MacKinnon's rage: "We are stripped of authority and
reduced and devalidated and silenced."
6
Many factors account for the silencing of women. All the fault does not lie
with the pornography industry, even less with the especially brutal kind of
pornography covered by the trafficking ban. One can only wonder how
much of this material is in circulation, taking its toll on the consciousness of
men and women or otherwise shaping our culture. But there is nothing in
the Constitution that precludes a legislative body from deciding that the si-
lencing of women occasioned by the circulation of this kind of material is of
sufficient magnitude to justify an attempt at regulation. Once again, this is a
matter that can well be trusted to legislative judgment. 6
1
There is a tradition in First Amendment cases of the judiciary making an
independent assessment of the facts that are offered in support of an order
stopping the circulation of a publication or film. This practice-most pro-
nounced during the Warren Court's administration of its obscenity doc-
trine62-stems from the special significance attributed to speech, lying as it
does at the heart of our democratic system. Such special scrutiny is not
wholly appropriate in this context, for speech appears as both the object and
justification of regulation; the speech of those producing and distributing
60. MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 193. A particular variety of this harm arises to the extent that
the materials covered by the trafficking offense present rape, mutilation, and battering as sexually
arousing entertainment and thus trivialize such acts of violence in the eyes of those (men) in charge
of the legislative and administrative machinery of the state.
61. See Michelman, supra note 59, at 307.
62. Chief Justice Warren himself objected to this practice in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202
(1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the "Court should not establish itself as an ultimate
censor," passing independent judgment on each new set of facts). On the so-called "technical pre-
ferred position" of the First Amendment, see KALVEN, supra note 39, at xxvii.
2060 [V/ol. 80:2041
HeinOnline -- 80 Geo. L.J. 2060 1991-1992
FREEDOM AND FEMINISM
pornographic material is restricted in order to enhance the speech of women.
Under these circumstances, a highly skeptical attitude towards legislative
judgments of fact might work against the preferred freedom.
However, even if legislators are granted a measure of deference, there is no
denying that the theory I have outlined for sustaining various applications of
the trafficking ban as a protection of speech would tax the imaginative and
temporal resources of the judiciary. The narrow technical question before
the court in each instance would be whether the film or publication met the
definition of pornography set forth in the ordinance. But in order to meet
the requirements of the First Amendment, the judge would have to make
some assessment of the entire environment of which the challenged material
was a part in order to determine whether it had the effect of silencing women,
or more precisely, whether the legislature had good reason for believing that
it had that effect. Are women speaking and being heard? Are they being
silenced or discredited by the pornography industry? What contribution
does the targeted work make to the power of that industry? Does the
targeted work present some unique perspective that must be protected in or-
der to avoid the suppression of an idea?
These inquiries, and all the others that might be required to operationalize
the silencing theory, are highly context dependent and broad ranging, but
they are not at all alien to free speech. They are foreshadowed by the third
branch of the Miller test, making the protection of speech dependent on
whether a work of art has serious political or aesthetic value. To take an
example from another branch of the law, comparable sociological inquiries
are required by the test that conditions interdiction of subversive advocacy
upon a showing of clear and present danger. This is especially true if, as
Learned Hand insisted in the communist conspiracy cases, the judge is to
take account of both the gravity of the danger and the probability of it mate-
rializing. 63 Moreover, however burdensome such inquiries might be, they
may be justified by the value they serve-strengthening democratic debate.
The purpose of the law is not to make judging easy, but to make sure that
justice is done.
The Indianapolis ordinance as a whole is rooted in a concern for equality,
and so is the trafficking ban. It is not based on a distaste or revulsion for the
kind of brutal pornography that it reaches, though that is surely present, but
aspires to make some small contribution to eradicating the social dynamics
that result in the subordination of women. Simply to offer equality-taken
as a Fourteenth Amendment value-as a defense for the trafficking regula-
tion will not meet the free speech objection, unless we somehow postulate a
63. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) ("In each case [the courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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priority for equality. However, once we understand that equality need not be
seen as an independent value, based solely on the Fourteenth Amendment,
but rather that it has First Amendment dimensions as well, the constitutional
issue presented by the trafficking provision appears in a wholly new light.
Democracy requires that everyone have an equal chance to speak and to be
heard and the trafficking provision, aimed as it is at the pornography indus-
try in its most extreme form, should be seen as a friend, rather than an enemy
of democracy: an effort to establish the preconditions for free and open
debate.
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